An Introduction to Hedge Funds by Mitra, Sovan
ar
X
iv
:0
90
4.
27
31
v2
  [
q-
fin
.G
N]
  1
7 A
pr
 20
09
An Introduction to Hedge Funds
Sovan Mitra
Abstract
This report was originally written as an industry white paper on Hedge Funds. This
paper gives an overview to Hedge Funds, with a focus on risk management issues. We
define and explain the general characteristics of Hedge Funds, their main investment
strategies and the risk models employed. We address the problems in Hedge Fund
modelling, survey current Hedge Funds available on the market and those that have
been withdrawn. Finally, we summarise the supporting and opposing arguments for
Hedge Fund usage.
A unique value of this paper, compared to other Hedge Fund literature freely avail-
able on the internet, is that this review is fully sourced from academic references (such
as peer reviewed journals) and is thus a bona fide study.
This paper will be of interest to: Hedge Fund and Mutual Fund Managers, Quan-
titative Analysts, “Front” and “Middle” office banking functions e.g. Treasury Man-
agement, Regulators concerned with Hedge Fund Financial Risk Management, Private
and Institutional Investors, Academic Researchers in the area of Financial Risk Man-
agement and the general Finance community.
Key words: Hedge Funds, risk management, risk measurement, regulation.
1. Introduction and Outline
According to the European Central Bank [Gar05], the Hedge Fund industry is grow-
ing rapidly with a total of US $1 trillion worth of assets under their control globally. A
Hedge Fund’s size is typically less than US $100 million, with nearly half under US $25
million [Gar05]. They represent a small percentage of the asset management industry
(see [Gar05]) yet they exert a disproportionately massive influence on the financial and
economic sector in relation to their size (see Fung [FH00a]). This is due to Hedge
Funds generally using dynamic and leveraged trading strategies, which is in contrast
to Mutual Funds that typically engage in buy-and-hold strategies. Thus it is apparent
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Hedge Funds have a significant influence in financial markets, yet knowledge of them
is relatively little.
In this paper we introduce Hedge Funds, attempting to firstly propose a definition
for Hedge Funds as no common consensus has yet been agreed within the Finance
community. We then explain the common investment strategies applied by Hedge
Funds e.g. event driven, long-only investment. In the next section, we survey the main
risk models applied to analysing Hedge Funds whilst also discussing the difficulties in
actually measuring Hedge Fund risks. Finally we finish by surveying current Hedge
Funds available on the market and famous Hedge Funds that have been withdrawn.
It is important to note that knowledge and performance of the Hedge Fund indus-
try is guarded with substantial secrecy. Consequently, the quality of information used
in any Hedge Fund study, can never be as good as those for other investment products
e.g. Mutual Funds (see Fung [FH00a],Fung [FH99a], Do et al. [DFW05]).
2. Introduction to Hedge Funds
Within the investment industry, many fund types exist: Hedge Funds, investment
trusts, unit trusts etc... yet the term Hedge Fund has no explicit definition. In fact the
European Central Bank states in its report on Hedge Funds [Gar05] that no common
Hedge Fund definition exists. Defining a Hedge Fund is in fact more problematic than
it appears. To appreciate the difficulty in defining a Hedge Fund, it is instructive to
know its brief history.
2.1. Brief History of the Hedge Funds Industry
According to Fung [FH99a], the first ever Hedge Fund was formed by Albert Wislow
Jones in 1949, so called as the main investment strategy was to take hedged equity
investments. By hedging (the act of removing risk in some investment by taking an
investment in another (typically related) investment) Winslow was able to eliminate
some market risks.
Hedge Funds then became first well-known after an article in Fortune(1966) mention-
ing Jones’s fund significantly outperforming other Mutual Funds [FH99a]. Although
this article initiated wide interest in Hedge Funds, their popularity diminished as it
fell victim to the bear markets of 1969-70 and 1973-4. A decade later (1986), interest
was revived by Robertson’s infamous Tiger Fund [FH99a], which achieved compound
annual returns of 43% for 6 years after all expenses. Fung in [FH99a] corroborates
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the impact that the publicity of Robertson’s Fund had on the Hedge Fund industry
by showing the rapid expansion of Hedge Funds and CTA funds (commodity trading
advisor funds (similar to Hedge Funds)) from 1985-97.
With numerous Hedge Fund investors and the fact that Hedge Funds were virtually
unregulated compared to other funds, a multitude of new Hedge Fund trading strate-
gies evolved, including the use of derivatives e.g. options. Now all these funds came to
be known as Hedge Funds yet many of them were using investment strategies beyond
simply “hedging” that A.Winslow first employed (see [Gar05] for more details). To
complicate matters further, as Hedge Fund strategies developed so also did funds other
than Hedge Funds begin employing Winslow’s equity hedging strategy, thus hedging
was no longer unique to Hedge Funds. Today, the word “hedge” in Hedge Funds has
become a misnomer, more of a historical hangover from Alfred Winslow rather than a
description.
2.2. A Definition of Hedge Funds
As the European Central bank states [Gar05]:
“there is no common definition of what constitutes a Hedge Fund,it can be described as
an unregulated or loosely regulated fund which can freely use various active investment
strategies to achieve positive absolute returns”.
As the European Central Bank implies, a Hedge Fund is difficult to define partly
because of a lack of clarity of agreement on its term and also due to its diverse trading
spectrum. They are typically characterised by high leveraging, derivatives trading and
short selling compared to Mutual Funds. One way of defining a Hedge Fund is by
comparing the similarities and differences with Mutual Funds. In a sense Hedge Funds
are similar to any other portfolio investment in 3 respects:
• they are funded by capital from investors, rather than bank loans or other sources
of capital;
• they invest in publicly traded securities e.g. equities and bonds;
• the capital is “managed” or invested by expert fund managers.
The key differences between Hedge Funds and Mutual Funds lies in the degree of
regulation, the level and variety of risky investment strategies. Whereas Mutual Funds
are required to adhere to strict financial regulations, including the types and levels of
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risks, Hedge Funds are free to pursue virtually any investment strategy with any level
of risk.
Secondly, Hedge Fund investors are typically high net worth individuals or institu-
tional investors e.g. pension funds [Gar05], partly because Hedge Funds typically
require high minimum investment amounts. A graph taken from the European Central
Bank [Gar05] shows the composition of Hedge Fund investors from 1992-2004.
Mutual funds on the other hand, are typically targetted at the general public and
will accept any investor who can meet the minimum investment amount. Hedge Funds
in fact are banned from advertising and in some cases the investors are required to be
“accredited”.
A third key difference is the fund portfolio composition. As Fung [FH99a] states,
the majority of Mutual Funds are composed of equities and bonds. Hedge fund port-
folio compositions are far more varied, with possibly a significant weighting in non-
equity/bond assets e.g. derivatives.
A fourth key difference is that the historical return characteristics and distribution
of Hedge Funds tend to differ significantly from Mutual Funds. For example, Capocci
et al. [CH04] and Getmansky [GLM04] demonstrate that Hedge Funds empirically
display serial correlation in returns. According to Brown [Bro01], Hedge Funds do not
perform significantly better than most investment funds; Hedge Funds between 1989-
95 earned 300 basis points below the S&P 500. However, other studies conclude that
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Hedge Funds produce excess market returns (see [CH04],[DFW05]). A graph below
from [Gar05] gives the performance of Hedge Funds compared to key indexes. The
CSFB/Tremont index is a Hedge Fund index, the “equivalent” of the FTSE-100 for
UK stocks.
2.3. Hedge Fund Performance Benchmark Targets
With Mutual Funds only 1 type of performance benchmark typically exists; the
fund is expected to match or excel a particular index e.g. FTSE-100 index, S&P 500
index. This is an example of a relative return target, which some Hedge Funds adopt as
their benchmark. However for Hedge Funds another benchmark exists called absolute
return targets.
An absolute return target is the typical benchmark choice for Hedge Funds and is
the opposite of relative return. It is a fixed return target and the fund is expected
to match/excel it regardless of the overall market performance. Hedge fund managers
use two main approaches to achieve absolute return targets: Market Timing and the
Non-Directional approach.
Market Timing
this approach takes positions by anticipating the market trend or direction (either
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moving up/down). This approach potentially offers high returns, as demonstrated by
Georg Soros in his Quantum Fund when speculating on the British Pound in 1992.
Non-Directional
An example of Non-Directional is A.Winslow’s Hedge Fund; it is a fund that eliminates
some market risks, hence it can be considered non-directional, whilst also benefitting
from relative price movements of assets. According to Fung [FH99a] the non-directional
approach has evolved over the last decade and is continuing to develop.
2.4. Hedge Fund Organisation
Hedge Funds typically prefer to concentrate their efforts on the key activity of max-
imising investment return, so non-essential operations are outsourced e.g. “back office”
functions. Actual trading transactions too are outsourced to “Prime Brokers”. Prime
brokers are banks or securities firms, offering brokerage and other financial services to
large institutional clients e.g. Pension Funds. It is also worth noting that Hedge Funds
typically reside “offshore” to take advantage of more favourable tax treatments and
regulations.
2.5. Fund of Hedge Funds (FOHF)
A Fund of Hedge Funds is simplistically a Mutual Fund that invests in multiple
Hedge Funds e.g 15-25 different Hedge Funds, furthermore F3 funds or fund of FOHF
also exist. All these funds provide diversification benefits and a method of investing in
Hedge Funds without requiring the skill to personally assess Hedge Funds individually.
Also, FOHF normally have significantly lower minimum investment levels compared to
a standard Hedge Fund, thus increasing investment access to the general public.
3. Hedge Fund Investment Strategies
The investment strategies employed by various Mutual funds are well documented,
ranging from value investing to buying growth stocks, with each having particular risk
and return implications. On the contrary, Hedge Fund investment strategies are far
less well documented and the variety of strategies are greater than for Mutual Funds.
Consequently, there is no widely accepted categorisation of Hedge Fund strategies,for
example, Stonham in [Sto99b] identifies 14 Hedge Fund strategy categories whereas
Fung [FH99a] only has 7.
We now describe the 7 main Hedge Fund investment strategies as given by Fung
[FH99a], which in turn are taken from MAR (Managed Account Reports (one of the
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oldest sources of global managed futures information )). The advantage of applying
such strategy categorisation is that different Hedge Fund return characteristics can be
explained by them (see [FH99a]).
3.1. Event Driven
An event driven strategy means a position is taken to take advantage of price moves
arising from new market information release or events occurring. A good example of
such a strategy is to capitalise on merger and acquisition announcements, which cause
the target company’s share price to rise. An example is given below; Mark’s and
Spencer’s share price rose on announcement of a takeover by Philip Green at the end
of May 2004.
3.2. Global
The Global strategy is an all-round category for funds that invest in assets beyond
those based in their home market. Other than that, no more specific technique is asso-
ciated with this. A typical example would be a Hedge Fund investing in an emerging
market such as India.
3.3. Global/Macro
The Global/Macro strategies utilise macroeconomic analysis to capitalize on asset
price changes that are strongly linked to macroeconomics e.g. currencies, bonds, stock
indices, and commodities. As the name implies, this startegy is applied on a global
7
scale. For example, George Soross Quantum Fund reputedly made US$1 billion in 1
day on September 1992 by speculating the British Pound would exit the European
Exchange Rate Mechanism.
3.4. Market Neutral
Market neutral investment refers to funds that hedge against market risk factors,
thereby becoming ”neutral” to the market. This strategy profits by speculating on
relative price movements between assets or indexes. Examples of this method include
long-short equity, stock index arbitrage, fixed income arbitrage. A good example of
the long-short equity method is the classic 1949 A.W. Jones Hedge Fund, who took
long and short positions in equities.
3.5. Sector
Sector Hedge Fund investing concentrate on investing in specific sectors e.g. airlines,
telecoms, utilities sectors etc... . The investment instrument itself can be a variety of
types e.g. short selling, long and leveraged positions.
3.6. Short Selling and Long-Only
Short selling and long-only Hedge Funds are those funds which will only invest by
shorting or going long respectively.
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4. Hedge Fund Risk Models
The necessity for Hedge Fund risk modelling and management originates from 2
areas:
• Hedge Funds experiencing some of the greatest losses ever witnessed by the in-
vestment community;
• new regulatory pressure enforcing more stringent Hedge Fund risk management.
Firstly, Hedge Funds have been responsible for numerous catastrophic losses, caus-
ing them to completely collapse and initiate a contagion effect by affecting numerous
economic and financial sectors. The most notorious example of such a catastrophic
loss being the Long Term Capital Management Hedge Fund, which lost US$2.1 Billion
[Sto99b] and almost brought down the entire US financial system.
Secondly, as already mentioned, Mutual Funds are tightly regulated whereas Hedge
Funds face little regulation. However, as Hedge Funds have gained public attention
and therefore more investment interest, this along with spectacular Hedge Fund disas-
ters have prompted increased Hedge Fund regulation.
It was not until after the 1997 Asian Currency Crisis though that regulators became
interested in regulating Hedge Fund activities [FH00a]. The IMF (International Mon-
etary Fund) initiated a study on the market influence of Hedge Funds by Eichengreen
[ES98]. This study described Hedge Funds activities and the potential problem of the
market impact of Hedge Funds.
Moreover in 2004, the Securities and Exchange Commission now required Hedge Fund
managers and sponsors to register as investment advisors under the Investment Advi-
sor’s Act of 1940. This greatly increases the number of requirements placed on Hedge
Funds e.g. keeping records and creating a code of ethics. For more information on
SEC regulation visit the SEC website http://www.sec.gov/.
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We now describe some of the quantitative risk models employed in modelling Hedge
Fund risks.
4.1. Markowitz ’s Portfolio Theory
Markowitz’s Portfolio Theory (from hereon MPT) is typically applied to assets/portfolios
whose return probability distributions approximate to a Normal distribution. Although
this approximation is not strictly correct for Hedge Funds, it is still a workable risk
model. In fact Fung and Hsieh in [FH99b] apply it to rank Hedge Fund performances.
Markowitz proposed a portfolio’s risk is equal to the variance of the portfolio’s re-
turns. If we define the weighted expected return of a portfolio Rp as
Rp =
N∑
i=1
wiµi, (1)
then the portfolio’s variance σ2p is
σ2p =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
σijwiwj, (2)
where
• N is the number of assets in a portfolio;
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• i,j are the asset indices and i, j ∈ {1, ..., N} ;
• wi is the asset weight, subject to the constraints:
0 ≤ wi ≤ 1,
N∑
i=1
wi = 1;
• σij is the covariance of asset i with asset j;
• µi is the expected return for asset i.
MPT also introduces the idea of an efficient frontier. For a given set of funds or assets
available to invest in, an upper concave boundary exists on the maximum portfolio re-
turns possible as risk or variance increases. Furthermore this concave relation between
risk and return incorporates the theory of expected utility concavely increasing with
risk.
Notice that MPT shows that some funds can perform lower than the risk free rate.
Naturally one wishes to choose the market portfolio which maximises return for a
given level of risk/volatility as shown.
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4.2. CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model)
Capocci and Hubner [CH04] state that in the 1980s CAPM and its variants (e.g.
Jensen’s measure) were applied to Hedge fund risk measurement. The CAPM model,
based on MPT, was invented by Sharpe [Sha64]:
Ra = Rf + β(Rm − Rf ) + ε,
where
• Ra is expected return of an asset;
• Rf is the risk-free rate of return;
• Rm is the expected market return;
• ε is the error term;
• β =
σam
σmm
;
• σam is the market and asset’s covariance;
• σmm is the market’s variance.
The CAPM model is applied generally in finance to determine a theoretically appro-
priate return of an asset. It presumes that investors must be compensated for investing
in a risky asset in 2 ways 1)time value of money and 2)risk itself. The time value of
money is accounted for by the risk-free rate Rf whereas the return from risk arises from
β(Rm −Rf ). The term (Rm −Rf) represents the expected risk premium, which is the
return obtained above the risk-free rate for investing in a risky asset. The beta term
can be considered the ”sensitivity” of the asset’s risk to market risk (both measured
by variance). Consequently more ”sensitive” assets ought to produce higher returns by
CAPM. The graph below shows how asset return is linearly related to beta and that
no beta implies a risk-free rate of return.
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4.3. Sharpe Ratio and the Modified Sharpe Ratio
The Sharpe Ratio S, invented by Sharpe [Sha66], is based on MPT’s risk measure
(variance):
S =
Rp −Rf
σp
,
where σp is the portfolio return’s standard deviation.
The Sharpe ratio can be intepretted as ”(Return - Risk-free rate)/risk” since Sharpe
considers standard deviation to be a risk measure. The Sharpe ratio provides a portfolio
risk measure in terms of the quality of the portfolio’s return at its given level of risk. A
discussion on the Sharpe ratio can be found at Sharpe’s website (www.stanford.edu/ wf-
sharpe/).
Fung and Hsieh in [FH00b] and [FH99b] use a modified version of the Sharpe ratio
to rank Hedge Fund performance so to specifically cater for Hedge Fund return distri-
butions. This is simply the Sharpe ratio without subtracting the risk free rate from
the numerator:
Modified Sharpe Ratio=
Rp
σp
.
4.4. Jenson’s Alpha and Treynor ratio
Based on CAPM, Jensen formulated a portfolio risk measure to quantify portfolio
returns above that predicted by CAPM called α:
α = Rp − [Rf + βp(Rm −Rf )].
One can interpret α as a measure of ”excess returns” or portfolio manager’s investment
ability or i.e. ”beating the market”.
The Treynor ratio is a lesser well known portfolio ratio measure, similar to the Sharpe
ratio, but assesses portfolio performance on a CAPM model basis:
Treynor Ratio=
Rp −Rf
βp
.
Like the Sharpe ratio, the Treynor ratio can be interpretted as the ”quality” of portfolio
return for the given level of risk but risk measured on a CAPM theory basis.
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4.5. Three Factor Model of Fama and French
The CAPMmodel is a single factor model that compares a portfolio with the market
as a whole. Fama and French modified this model in [FF93] to take into account 2
empirical observations about asset classes that tend to have higher returns:
• small sized companies;
• value stocks (companies with high book to market value).
Having a higher return implies a higher risk premium associated with them. The 3
factor model accounts for these higher premiums with the following equation:
Ra = Rf + βp1(Rm − Rf ) + βp2SMB + βp3HML+ ε,
where
• SMB is the difference in return for small and large sized companies;
• HML is the difference in return for high book to market value and low book to
market value companies;
• βp1, βp2, βp3 are regression gradients (slopes).
Essentially the 3 factor model is a multiple linear regression equation. Jagadeesh and
Titman in [JT93] modify the CAPM model by adding a momentum to account for
return. Fung and Hsieh in [FH04] apply both these models to long/short equity Hedge
Funds, giving regression results.
4.6. Sharpe’s Asset Class Factor Model
Sharpe in [Sha92] invented an asset factor model for risk measurement of Mutual
Funds but Fung and Hsieh in [FH97] have applied it to Hedge Funds. This model
essentially suggests that most Mutual Fund performances can be replicated by a small
number of major asset classes e.g. large capitalisation growth stocks, large capitali-
sation value stocks, small capitalisation stocks etc... . Using Fung and Hsieh [FH97]
notation Sharpe’s model is:
Rp =
∑
k
wkFk + ǫ,
subject to:
• wk =
∑
j
xjλj;
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• ǫ =
∑
j
xjǫj,
where
• j is the asset class;
• k is the total number of asset classes;
• xj is the weighting of asset class j;
• λj is the factor loading for asset j (change in fund return/change in asset j return);
• ǫj is the error term for asset j
Thus Hedge Fund return is a weighted average of a small number of asset classes, rather
than a weighted average of a large number of individual asset returns as in MPT.
4.7. VaR (Value at Risk)
VaR (value at risk) was invented by JP Morgan in 1994 as a general risk manage-
ment tool and has now become the industry standard for risk. It has become a popular
and important risk measure primarily because of the Basel Committee, who standard-
ise international banking regulations and practises. Gupta and Liang in [GL05] applied
VaR to Hedge Funds, specifically for assessing a Hedge Fund’s sufficient capital ade-
quecy.
VaR tells us in monetary terms how much one’s portfolio can expect to lose, for a
given cumulative probability and for a given time horizon. For example, for a cumu-
lative probability of 99% over a period of 1 day, the VaR amount would tell us the
amount by which one would expect the portfolio to lose e.g.$100.
VaR can be calculated by simulation using historical data or some mathematical
formula. VaR can also be calculated by the “variance-covariance method” (also known
as the delta-normal method) but makes unrealistic assumptions about portfolio returns
e.g. returns are normally distributed.
5. Problems with Hedge Fund Risk Modelling
Most portfolio risk measures make unrealistic modelling assumptions, particularly
with respect to the assumed return probability distributions for mutual funds. Risk
measurement assumptions become even more unrealistic for Hedge Funds. We now
explain the difficulties in Hedge Fund risk measurement.
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5.1. Non-Normal Return Distribution
As stated by Do et al.[DFW05], Hedge Fund returns do not approximate to normal
distributions, thus popular portfolio risk measures (which assume a normal distribu-
tion) are inappropriate e.g. Sharpe ratio. Furthermore Fung in [FH99a] shows that
the empirical probability distribution of monthly returns for Hedge and Mutual Funds
differ significantly.
Fung [FH99a] proposes the reason for a non-normal return distribution is a result
of the diverse trading strategies employed by Hedge Funds. Fung firstly suggests that
Mutuals engage in buy-and-hold strategies whereas Hedge Funds engage in much more
shorter term trading strategies. Secondly, Hedge Funds apply substantial leveraging,
whereas Mutuals have limited or strict regulation on leveraging. Additionally, the
relatively regulation-free investment environment of Hedge Funds leads to complex
management strategies and high performance incentives -these all affect Hedge Fund
returns.
5.2. Investment Strategy and Return Distribution
It has been empirically observed that different investment strategies significantly
alter the return distribution, particularly the mean and standard deviation. For exam-
ple standard deviation, a common risk metric, varies from a low 2.1% in market neutral
funds to 16.3% in Global/Macro funds [FH99a]. Consequently, it has been argued it
would be better to apply separate risk measures for each Hedge Fund type (according
to its strategy), rather than treating all Hedge Funds as part of 1 homogenous class.
5.3. Hedge Fund Failure Rate
Hedge fund survival rates are significantly lower than other funds [Gar05] and sub-
stantially vary; cumulative failure rates after 7 years range from 32-66% depending
on the Hedge Fund’s size. The table below from the European Central Bank [Gar05]
describes this:
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Thus the inclusion of non-existent Hedge Funds poses a problem when assessing the
overall performance of Hedge Funds (similar to the survivorship bias issue with Mutual
Fund performance).
6. Hedge Funds Available On The Market
6.1. Close Man Hedge Fund
Close Man Hedge Fund is an absolute return Hedge Fund. This fund applies the
market neutral investment strategy (specifically fixed income arbitrage) by investing
solely in Capital Guaranteed Bonds issued by The Royal Bank of Scotland. Thus the
fund is theoretically insulated from market risks but can still benefit from price move-
ments using a variety of techniques. For this particular fund, Close Man will engage
in leveraging and using swaps (a type of derivative) to boost returns.
See Close Man’s website http://www.closefm.com/ for more detail.
6.2. RAB Capital
RAB Capital is a unique Hedge Fund in that it is one of the few UK Hedge Funds
(or more specifically FOHF) that is listed on the London Stock Exchange (ticker sym-
bol RAB.L).Their funds are accessible to the general public rather than high net worth
individuals, although RAB warns “These funds are not appropriate for a novice in-
vestor”. They specialise in a variety of absolute return funds, some of which employ
the long-only investment strategy, where assets are bought on the basis that they are
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considered undervalued.
See RAB Capital’s website http://www.rabcap.com/ for more detail.
6.3. Thames River Capital
Thames River Capital is an absolute return based Hedge Fund, offering a range of
regulated and unregulated funds. Each fund uses various investment strategies, ranging
from Global strategies (see Global Emerging Market Fund) to market neutral strategies
using high leverage.
See Thames River Capital’s wesbite http://www.thamesriver.co.uk/ for more detail.
6.4. Ikos Hedge Fund
The founder and co-owner of her own hedge fund has made Elena Ambrosiadou one
of the richest women in Britain according to the 2006 Sunday Times Rich List. This
hedge fund engages in “program trading” whereby trades are executed according to a
computer program. This method of trading has the advantage removing any subjective
decision making from speculation but can also result in investments that one would
strongly and intuitively disapprove. Ikos focus on exchange rate investing but also
speculate in equities.
For more information on Ikos see http://www.ikosam.com/.
7. Famous Hedge Funds Withdrawn From The Market
All major funds are susceptible to collapsing, however, in the case of Hedge Funds
this is more frequent and the losses tend to be substantially higher. It is therefore
quite informative to understand some of the spectacular Hedge Fund losses. We now
describe some Hedge Funds that were previously available on the market but have now
ceased trading.
7.1. George Soros’s Quantum Fund
Perhaps the most famous Hedge Fund investor is Soros, who in 1 day made US$1
billion on September 6, 1992, by short selling the British pound. In 1992, Britain
was part of the ERM (European Exchange Rate Mechanism) and Soros was able to
anticipate the currency devaluation of the British Pound. Consequently by employing
the Global/Macro investment strategy, Soros managed to net a profit of US$1 billion in
1 day. However years later, his fund suffered massive losses; in 1998 Russia’s defaulting
crisis created a loss of US $2 billion.
19
7.2. Long Term Capital Management (LTCM)
Perhaps the most notorious Hedge Fund collapse was in September 1998; LTCM
announced it had lost 44% of its investors’ capital in August alone (US$2.1 Billion)
[Sto99b]. For a detailed case study of LTCM see Stonham in [Sto99b],[Sto99a].
LTCM began trading with over $1 billion of investor capital. LTCM applied the Hedge
Fund strategy of market neutral investment;LTCM used the method of fixed income
arbitrage, taking advantage of temporary changes in prices. The market neutral strat-
egy was successful from 1994-98 but in 1998 Russian financial markets fell into crisis.
However, LTCM speculated that the situation would quickly return back to normal
again, so LTCM took large, unhedged positions. Unfortunately, Russia began default-
ing on its debts in August 1998, causing LTCM to experience losses approaching $4
billion as it was significantly exposed to Russian government bonds. The US Federal
Government then devised a rescue plan for LTCM to avert a major US financial crisis
and panic.
7.3. Robertson’s Tiger Management Fund
Robertson’s Hedge Fund invested by going long on undervalued stocks whilst simul-
taneously short selling what he considered overvalued stocks. For years this strategy
was extremely successful, giving annual returns of 43% from 1980-86, so he continued
applying this strategy during the technology boom. During the tech boom, Robertson
rightly considered many stocks to be overvalued and so began short selling such stocks
with the expectation overvalued stocks would eventually fall. Yet during the tech boom
a speculation bubble formed, causing the overvalued stocks to continue to rise beyond
expectation. Consequently Robertson’s fund collapsed in 2000 after heavy losses, just
before the speculative bubble itself collapsed.
8. The Case For and Against Hedge Funds
Despite the potential to provide substantial returns, it would appear conclusive
that Hedge Funds ought to be abolished or at least highly regulated. However the
issue is far more complex than one assumes. We now elaborate on the benefits and
disadvantages of Hedge Funds.
8.1. The Case for Preserving Hedge Funds
It can be argued Hedge Funds provide an economic benefit to markets, in particular
they aid price discovery. It has been suggested that Hedge Funds take contrarian posi-
tions; they do not engage in “herd-mentality” trading, unlike Mutual Funds. Therefore
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Hedge Funds buy or sell assets according to the perceived fair value.
A second economic benefit of Hedge Funds is that they aid competition and the eco-
nomic concept of the ”invisible hand” [DTZ05] and thrive on market inefficiencies.
As traders do not have instantaneous and costless access to market information, asset
mispricing or an arbitrage opportunities must occur e.g. an asset trading in 2 differ-
ent markets may have different prices. Hedge Funds take advantage of such arbitrage
opportunities and so push prices to their no-arbitrage price.
Another important economic benefit of Hedge Funds is liquidity provision. Hedge
Funds typically invest in riskier assets that many investors would not consider. Hedge
Funds therefore provide much needed capital for investments.
Hedge Funds can actually reduce overall risk rather than increase it. Firstly, Hedge
Funds take on riskier investments, thereby “absorbing” some of the risk that would be
concentrated in a smaller number of funds. Additionally Hedge Funds are more willing
to invest in volatile markets, thereby “absorbing” the effects of market shocks.
Hedge Funds are important as an investment product in itself. They provide sophis-
ticated investors with another vehicle for high returns that would not be available in
traditional Mutual Funds [DTZ05]. They also provide diversification (a method of re-
ducing risk without reducing return by investing in more than 1 asset) as they represent
a different investment class.
A second benefit from a investor’s perspective is that Hedge Funds can provide ”abso-
lute” returns. Hedge Funds can achieve this because they pursue a variety of sophisti-
cated investment strategies. Traditional Mutual Funds are limited in trading strategies
due to heavy regulation.
8.2. The Case Against Hedge Funds
Rather than aid market functioning, Hedge Funds have been criticized for doing
more harm than good. Firstly, rather than contrarian investing, Hedge Funds engage
in ”herding” [DTZ05]. Notable examples include the 1992 ERM crisis and the 1997
Asian Currency Crisis.
Secondly, it was suggested Hedge Funds provide much needed capital by investing in
risky assets, yet Hedge Funds have been blamed for exhausting liquidity in the market
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[DTZ05]. Due to Hedge Funds typically taking large positions and the trading strate-
gies they pursue, they are unable to make trades without causing a massive price moves
due to illiquidity (Fung supports this idea in [FH00a]). Additionally, Hedge Funds are
usually heavily leveraged, increasing the likelihood of illiquidity e.g.LTCM. However,
Gupta in [GL05] investigates capital adequacy using VaR (value at risk) measures and
concludes that most Hedge Funds are adequately funded.
Thirdly, Hedge Funds can prevent efficient market functioning by causing market price
distortions, rather than aiding price discovery. Large volume trades can cause signifi-
cant price movements, rather than price movements occurring due to company/economic
fundamentals. Fung in [FH00a] cites such examples as the 1992 ERM Crisis but con-
cludes that Hedge Funds overall do not distort prices beyond their company/economic
fundamentals.
The Hedge Fund as a viable alternative investment product has also been heavily
disapproved. For instance some quotes from leading academics on Hedge Funds:
• “If you want to invest in something where they steal your money and don’t tell
you what they‘re doing, be my guest., Eugene Fama.
• “If there’s a license to steal, it’s in the hedge fund arena”, Burton Malkiel.
In an article in Forbes (May 14, 2004) Bernard Condon claims that “You would do
better giving your money to a monkey” than investing in Hedge Funds. As a managed
investment product Hedge Funds command the highest management fees, typically
around 20%, compared to mutual funds that normally charge around 1%. Addition-
ally Hedge Fund investors have tougher withdrawal constraints.
Secondly as Fama mentions, Hedge Funds have poor transparency. Regulatory bodies
such as the SEC do not dictate the same strict rules for Hedge Funds that it does for
Mutual Funds: there are no rules on publishing records on asset holdings and financial
performance, lack of transparency increases the chances of investors being unable to
effectively assess risk.
Finally, Hedge Funds have a higher failure rate than Mutual Funds and thus a higher
credit risk. Hedge Fund face less regulation on leveraging and investment strategies,
thus are susceptible to a higher probability of default e.g. LTCM. Consequently there
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is less likelihood of capital recovery.
9. Conclusion
Hedge Funds are clearly a complex and unique investment product that can pro-
duce extraordinary gains as well as losses. They have and continue to thrive on the
unregulated aspects of the business, spawning a variety of innovative investment tech-
niques. It has only been in the past 10 years that regulatory bodies have focussed on
Hedge Fund regulation to avert previous Hedge Fund disasters e.g. LTCM.
Despite the clear necessity to understand such a powerful investment, knowledge and
understanding of the Hedge Fund industry remains relatively poor. There is no consen-
sus on the specific definition of a Hedge Fund, very little literature is devoted to Hedge
Fund risk modelling and their various investment techniques. Consequently there is a
large scope for future research into Hedge Fund risk management.
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